Untaxed and Taxed Entities in the Market for Commercial Real Estate by John F. McDonald
































INTERNATIONAL REAL ESTATE REVIEW 




Untaxed and Taxed Entities in the Market for 
Commercial Real Estate 
 
 
John F. McDonald 
Walter  E.  Heller  College  of  Business  Administration;  Roosevelt  University; 
Chicago, Illinois, USA, 60605; Office Phone: 312-281-3287; Fax: 312-281-3123; 





This paper is a theoretical examination of untaxed and taxed entities 
that invest in real estate. The standard advice to real estate investors is 
to  avoid  using  entities  that  are  subject  to  taxation  (such  as  C 
corporations in the U.S.) and employ entities that are not subject to 
taxation (such as limited liability companies, S corporations, and real 
estate investment trusts in the U.S.) in order to avoid double taxation of 
income.  This  paper  shows  that,  in  most  situations,  untaxed  entities 
place a greater value of a given real estate property than does a taxed 
entity, which implies that taxed entities are at a distinct disadvantage at 
competing  in  the  market  for  property.  However,  this  conclusion  is 
reversed if untaxed entities use a large amount of financial leverage 
compared to taxed entities and the borrowing rate for both is greater 








































1.   Introduction 
 
Real estate investors are advised to use organizational forms that avoid double 
taxation and provide for limited liability. For example, the text by Brueggeman 
and  Fisher  (2011)  includes  a  lengthy  discussion  of  organizational  forms. 
Entities in the U.S. that are not subject to taxation at the entity level include 
partnerships, limited liability partnerships, limited liability companies (LLCs), 
S  corporations,  and  real  estate  investment  trusts  (REITs).  They  state  that 
(2011, p. 579), “A disadvantage of a C corp is that it provides no option for 
pass-through  taxation,”  and  that  (p.  578),  “The  flexibility  of  pass-through 
taxation, limited liability, and management structure have made the LLC an 
increasingly popular choice for ownership entity, especially for the ownership 
of commercial real estate.”   
 
This paper is a theoretical examination of four questions: 
 What values do untaxed entities place on real estate investment properties, 
and how does value depend upon financial leverage? 
 What values do taxed entities place on the same real estate investment 
properties, and how does value depend upon financial leverage? 
 How do the answers to these first two questions depend upon whether the 
interest rate on borrowed funds is at the risk-free rate or at a higher rate? 
 Do untaxed entities always place a higher value on a given investment 
property, or are there circumstances under which the taxed entity places 
the higher value on a property? 
 
The paper combines the Modigliani-Miller (1958) propositions with regards 
to financial leverage with the standard capital asset pricing model to answer 
these questions. The basic result is that, if the interest rate on borrowed funds 
exceeds the risk-free rate, there are conditions under which the taxed entity 
will place a higher value on an investment property than will an untaxed entity.  
Those conditions involve a sizable amount of borrowing by the untaxed entity. 
 
The final section of the paper includes an examination of the rules that govern 
REITs in several major countries. REITs are a popular choice for an entity 
that  invests  in  real  estate  with  limited  shareholder  liability  and  favorable 
income  tax  treatment.  Corporate  income  tax  rates  for  these  countries  are 
compared in this section.  
 
 
2.   Modigliani-Miller Propositions 
 
Considerations of financial leverage implicitly or explicitly make use of the 
propositions of Modigliani and Miller (1958).  MM Propositions I and II are 
































 The market  value of a firm  is independent of its capital structure. The 
basic  proposition  was  demonstrated  by  assuming  no  taxation  and  a 
constant borrowing and lending rate, but was also demonstrated for the 
case  in  which  the  borrowing  and  lending  rate  increases  with  financial 
leverage.    Alternatively,  the  average  cost  of  capital  is  independent  of 
financial  leverage.  Stiglitz  (1969)  provides  a  more  general  proof  of 
Proposition I. 
 The expected rate of return to equity invested in the firm [E (Re)] is equal to 
expected rate of return in the absence of borrowing [E(R)] plus an amount 
that is a linear function of the ratio of debt to equity. That function is: 
) / ]( ) ( [ ) ( ) ( S D r R E R E R E f e    ,                (1) 
where rf is the risk-free borrowing and lending rate, D is debt, and S is 
equity. E(R) is the rate of return to the asset in the absence of borrowing 
and [E(R) – rf] is the risk premium for the investment without leverage. 
Clearly, the expected rate of return to equity is increased by borrowing if 
the expected rate of return to the investment without borrowing exceeds 
the rate of interest on borrowing. 
 
Demonstrations of the MM propositions are included in the Appendix.  The 
Appendix includes a generalization of the MM propositions to the case in 
which the interest rate on borrowed funds exceeds the (risk-free) lending rate 
and a generalization of Hamada’s (1972) equation for the “beta” of a financial 
asset with leverage. 
 
A fundamental point in this paper is that the value of a real estate investment 
is not independent of its capital structure because the borrowing rate is greater 
than the lending rate, especially if the borrowing rate increases with the loan-
to-value ratio. Consider a modification of the demonstration of homemade 
leverage  used  by  Modigliani  and  Miller  (1958,  pp.  270-271)  for  MM 
Proposition I. Suppose an investor owns a property (no borrowing) with value 
V1 that produces annual income Y1 = X, net operating income plus capital 
appreciation. Then suppose that this investor decides to sell this property and 
purchase a portion of the equity in another property with annual income X that 
is in the same “risk class,” and lends the remaining amount of his/her funds to 
some other investor (e.g., purchases bonds). The investor’s return from this 
alternative investment portfolio is 
L R B R X E e Y L B    ) )( ( 2 2 2 ,           (2)  
where  e2  is  the  investor’s  equity  investment,  E2  is  the  total  equity  in  the 
property, RB and RL are the borrowing and lending rates, B is the amount that 
was borrowed on the property, and L is the amount lent by the investor. The 
investor receives a share of the return to equity in the property plus interest on 



































new portfolio equal X? We know that V1 = e2 + L and V2 = E2 + B.  Modigliani 
and Miller (1958, p. 270) propose homemade leverage where: 
1 2 2 2 ) ( V V E e   and  1 2) ( V V B L  . 
Substitution of these amounts into Equation (2) produces 
) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 2 B L R R B V V X V V Y    .                   (3) 
The  arbitrage  condition Y2 = X holds if RL = RB and V1 = V2. This is MM 
Proposition  I.  However,  if  the  borrowing  rate  that  was  used  exceeds  the 
lending rate available to the investor in question, then Y2 = X if 
1 ) )( / ( 1 1 2     B L R R X B V V .                  (4) 
If the borrowing rate is greater than the lending rate available to the investor, 
then  the  value  of  the  property  in  the  new  portfolio  must  be  lower  than  the 
property  with  no  borrowing,  and  the  reduction  in  value  depends  upon  the 
amount that  was borrowed and the diffe rence in the two interest rates. The 
borrowing  rate  in  real  estate  increases  with  the  loan -to-value  ratio,  so  the 
lending rate can equal the borrowing rate if somehow the investor loans  to 
some other real estate investors who have applied the same degree of leverage 
as was applied to the property involved in this example. This is an unlikely 
scenario, so in this paper, it is assumed that borrowing rates for real estate 
investors are greater than the lending rates that are available to them.     
 
 
3.   Modigliani-Miller and the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
 
The basic approach in this paper is to embed the leverage question in the 
single-period capital asset pricing model (CAPM). This method originated with 
Hamada (1969), and this paper extends some of the results obtained therein. As 
presented in the text by Luenberger (1998) and many others, the assumptions 
of the CAPM are well known, and include: 
 there are perfect capital markets. Information is available to all at no cost; 
 assets are fixed in supply; 
 investors are risk averters and maximize expected utility of wealth; 
 portfolios  are  assessed  based  on  expected  rate  of  return  and  standard 
deviation of return; and 
 the  planning  horizon  is  the  same  for  all  investors,  who  have  identical 
estimates of the expected rates of return and standard deviations of returns. 
 
Given these assumptions, the market equilibrium expected rate of return for 
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Here, rm is the rate of return to the market portfolio, and λ is known as the 
price of risk. Empirical estimates of β, “beta,” for commercial real estate tend 
to be less than 1.0.  For example, Briedenbach, Mueller, and Schulte (2006) 
estimate a national commercial real estate beta of 0.46 using returns to the 
NAREIT Index for equity REITs for 1979-2000. 
 
Consider an untaxed entity that invests in commercial real estate. The expected 
rate of return to that investment E (Rut) is       
ut ut ut S iD X E R E / ] ) ( [ ) (   ,                                    (6) 
where X = net operating income for the year plus any percentage change in 
market value, Dut is the amount borrowed at interest rate i, and Sut is the equity 
investment. Interest rate i is the interest rate on borrowed funds for real estate 
investment, and assumed to be equal to or greater than the risk-free interest 
rate. The real property serves as collateral for the loan, so the interest rate 
charged to real estate investors is  generally lower than the interest rate on 
unsecured personal loans. “Homemade leverage” in the form of personal loans 
normally cannot be employed in the case of real estate investments. The risk-
free  rate  is  the  lending  rate  in  this  paper  because  investors  can  choose  to 
invest in short-term government bonds. The after-tax expected rate of return 
to the equity invested in the property for a taxed entity is 
t t t S D t i t X E R E / ] ) 1 ( ) 1 )( ( [ ) (     ,                        (7) 
where t is the tax rate and St is the equity investment. Interest is a deductible 
expense.  Deductions  for  commercial  real  estate  in  the  U.S.  also  include 
depreciation. The sum of depreciation deductions is “recaptured” when the 
property is sold. These complications are omitted in this paper. The tax rate in 
this model is the tax imposed on the investing entity such as a corporation that 
is subject to corporate income tax, and assumed to be the same for all forms of 
income. A further assumption about taxes is that all individuals are subject to 
the same personal income tax rate. This assumption means that the personal 
income tax drops out of the analysis. 
 
Hamada’s (1969) method is to solve Equations (6) and (7) for E(X), insert the 
basic CAPM equilibrium condition from Equation (5), and equate the results: 
t m t f t ut m ut f ut iD r R r t S iD r R r S       )] , cov( )][ 1 /( [ )] , cov( [   .   (8)  
The two covariance terms are transformed as follows: 
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Substitution of these results into Equation (8) produces  
) ( ) 1 /( ut t f t f ut D D i t r S r S     .                (11) 
Three special cases of Equation (11) are of interest as preliminary steps. 
 
1.  The value of the property in the absence of borrowing is simply Vut = Sut 
and Vt = St. In this case, Vt = (1-t) Vut. If no borrowing takes place, the 
untaxed entities place a higher value on properties. 
2.  With borrowing, the value of the property is Vut =Sut+Dut and Vt =St+Dt. 
Assume that borrowing is at the risk-free rate rf. In this case, rf drops out 
of Equation (11) and 
t ut t tD t V V    ) 1 ( .        (12) 
Because of MM Proposition I, Vut does not depend upon financial leverage 
and is therefore a constant. Equation (12) is a version of the familiar result 
that the tax benefits of borrowing at the risk-free rate equal tDt. The value 
of the property for the taxed entity equals the value of the property for the 
untaxed  entity  only  if  borrowing  is  100%  of  the  property  value.  This 
condition ordinarily cannot be met, so if borrowing is done at the risk-free 
rate, the untaxed entity places a higher value on a property than does the 
taxed entity. 
3.  Now assume that borrowing is done at interest rate i, greater than rf. This 
is the more realistic case. Assume first that the untaxed entity does not 
borrow. With Dut = 0, manipulation of equation (11) produces 
] / ) 1 ( 1 [ ) 1 ( f t ut t r t i D t V V      .      (13) 
Note that Equation (13) reduces to Equation (12) if i = rf. The value of the 
property for the taxed entity changes with borrowing according to 
f t t r t i dD dV / ) 1 ( 1 /    , 
so the value of the property is increased by borrowing only if the after-tax 
borrowing rate i(1-t) is less than the risk-free rate. In this case, because 
borrowing is now more costly with i > rf, the taxed entity must borrow 
more than 100% of Vut in order to make Vt = Vut. For example, if t = 0.35, 
rf = 0.03, and i = 0.04, Vt = Vut when Dt/Vut = 2.625. 
 
As  a  final  and  most  important  case,  assume  that  the  untaxed  entity  does 
borrow in order to assume more risk and increase the expected rate of return 
to equity according to MM Proposition II. Both entities borrow at interest rate 
i. In this case, the value of the property for the untaxed entity declines with 
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and the value of the property for the taxed entity is a function of borrowing 
according to 
] / ) 1 ( 1 [ ) 1 ( 0 f t D t r t i D V t V       .                  (15) 
Here,  VD=0  is  the  value  of  the  property  for  the  untaxed  entity  with  no 
borrowing (D=0). These results can be found by using the same procedure as 
in Equations (5) to (11). Note that Equation (14) reduces the MM Proposition 
I if i = rf.  Jaffe (1991) shows that the values of untaxed entities are invariant 
with  respect  to  leverage  if  borrowing  and  lending  rates  are  equal.  Also, 
Equation (15) is identical to Equation (13). A demonstration of Equation (14) 
is provided in the Appendix. The value of the property for the taxed entity 
begins  at  a  lower  amount  compared  to  the  value  of  the  property  for  the 
untaxed  entity,  (1-t)VD=0  versus  VD=0,  but  this  value  for  the  taxed  entity 
increases with leverage if i(1-t) is less than rf, and otherwise is constant [if i(1-
t) = rf] or declines with leverage at a slower rate compared to the value of the 
property for the untaxed entity; 1 – i(1-t)/rf versus 1 – i/rf. The case in which 
the after-tax borrowing rate i(1-t) is greater than the risk-free rate rf is most 
likely. Examples of these two value functions are depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 shows that the value of the property for the taxed entity exceeds the 
value of the property for the untaxed entity if borrowing by the untaxed entity 
is sufficiently large. If the two entities borrow the same amount, and equating  
Equations (14) and (15), the values are equal at 
i r V D f D / / 0   .             (16) 
For example, if rf = 0.03 and i = 0.05, then the two entities attach the same 
value to the property if both borrow D/VD=0 = 0.60; i.e. borrowing equal to 
60% of the value of the property  for the untaxed entity  in the absence of 
borrowing. If both entities borrow more than this amount, the taxed entity 
places the greater value on the property. 
 
 
4.  Market Equilibrium 
 
Thus far the paper has considered only the individual property and individual 
real estate investing firm. Now consider the market for a particular type of 
commercial real estate. The supply of this asset is fixed (as are the supplies of 
all other assets), and the total value of the properties of this type is small in 
relationship to the total value of all assets. There are many investing firms. 
Firms whose returns are untaxed may choose to borrow in order to invest in 
this type of commercial real estate and increase the expected rate of return to 
equity. Borrowing by untaxed entities may enable the taxed entity to compete 



































increasing their ability to make higher bids for property. What is the market 
equilibrium value of a particular type of commercial real estate, given that 
(potentially) two different types of investors are in the market? 
 
 
Figure 1  Value Functions for Untaxed and Taxed Entities 
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First, it is reasonable to presume that the interest rate for borrowing exceeds 
the risk-free rate. Market equilibrium is established by the willingness of the 
marginal investor to pay for the properties. Some tax-advantaged entities such 
as pension funds borrow little or nothing and have high reservation prices (but 
can  purchase  properties  for  less  than  their  reservation  prices).Other  tax-
advantaged entities borrow a great deal of  money because they are equity 
constrained,  or  simply  because  they  wish  to  increase  the  expected  rate  of 
return to equity by using financial leverage. Under these conditions, the taxed 
entities may be able to compete for investment properties. Figure 1 shows that 
if the marginal untaxed entity borrows amount D*, then the taxed entity that 
borrows D* is also a marginal investor. Indeed, the intersection of the two 
valuation  functions  in  Figure  1  establishes  the  limits  of  borrowing  by  the 
untaxed entities. Untaxed entities that borrow more than D* will lose out to 
taxed entities. Therefore, both untaxed and taxed entities can co-exist in the 
market for investment properties. 
 
Figure 2 displays an example of equilibrium in the market for a particular type 
of commercial real estate property. Supply is fixed at S. The demand for this 
type of property by untaxed entities has a horizontal portion at VD=0 for those 
entities that do not borrow, and then the demand price declines with quantity 
as untaxed entities that borrow are added - in order of the amount that they 
































after-tax cost of borrowing is greater than the risk-free interest rate, and so is 
drawn with a slight positive slope. The demand price for taxed entities rises 
with quantity because these entities are added from the right-hand side of the 
diagram in the order of the amount they choose to borrow (i.e., those that 
choose not to borrow are added first). Equilibrium is established at V*, with 




Figure 2  Market for Real Estate Properties 
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Is the situation depicted in Figure 2 likely to occur?  In particular, does the 
untaxed  entity  that  borrows  a  substantial  amount  place  a  lower  value  on 
properties than the taxed entity that does not borrow (or borrows very little)?  
The  valuation  functions,  Equations  (14)  and  (15),  can  be  used  for  simple 
numerical  examples.    From  Equation  (15),  the  taxed  entity  that  does  not 
borrow values a property at Vt/VD=0 = (1-t).  Manipulation of Equation (14) 
produces 
)]} / ( 1 [ 1 /{ 1 / 0 f D ut r i m V V     ,          (17) 
where m is the loan-to-value ratio   (with borrowing).   Many untaxed entities do 
a substantial amount of borrowing. For example, Chan, Erickson, and Wang 
(2003,)  show  that  187  U.S.  REITs  in  2000  borrowed  an  average  of  50% 
measured as long-term debt to total capital and 46% measured as long-term 
debt  to  total  market  capitalization.  An  earlier  study  by  Maris  and  Elayan 
(1990) found that 310 U.S. REITs in their sample borrowed an average of 
36%  in  1987,  but  that  16% of  these  companies  borrowed  more  than  70% 



































that the marginal untaxed entity borrows 75% and that the corporate income 
tax rate is 35% (the U.S. federal tax rate).  These figures imply that Vut/VD=0 = 
(1-t) if the ratio of the borrowing rate to the risk-free lending rate (i/rf) is 1.63. 
This means that, for example, if the risk-free rate is 3.00%, the borrowing rate 
can be as low as 4.89% for the taxed entity that does not borrow to place an 
equal value on an investment property as the marginal untaxed entity. In short, 
given  that  some  untaxed  entities  employ  substantial  amounts  of  financial 
leverage, it is quite possible that taxed entities can effectively compete in the 
market for investment properties.  Indeed, as shown in the next section, the 
corporate income tax rate is lower in many of the other countries in which 
untaxed REITs are allowed. 
 
 
5.   Implications for Foreign Investors 
 
The model presented in this paper makes a simple distinction between untaxed 
and taxed entities, where the main distinction is between entities that are or 
are  not  subject  to  corporate  income  tax  (with  deductions  for  interest 
payments). Most  nations  have a corporate income tax. The KPMG (2009) 
survey  of  corporate  tax  rates  includes  116  nations  –  from  Afghanistan  to 
Zimbabwe. Six of these impose no corporate income tax (Bahamas, Bahrain, 
Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Guernsey, and Isle of Man). The highest corporate 
income tax rate reported by KPMG (2009) is 55% in South Africa and United 
Arab Emirates. KPMG (2009) notes that some of these countries are limiting 
deductions  for  interest  payments  by  corporations.  Most  nations  permit  the 
ownership of real estate by individuals and partnerships with tax liability only 
at the individual level. However, ownership by individuals or partners exposes 
one to unlimited liability whereas ownership of shares in a corporation does 
not. Consequently, many countries have forms of real estate ownership that 
combine  exemption  from  income  taxation  and  limited  liability.  Limited 
partnerships and LLCs are examples in the U.S.  The REIT is an increasingly 
popular ownership vehicle around the world that combines limited liability 
and favorable tax treatment at the entity level. See Chan, Erickson, and Wang 
(2003) for a detailed survey of REITs in the U.S. and a discussion of the 
adoption and growth of this type of entity in several nations around the world. 
 
This section has three purposes. The first is to present the basic features of 
REIT entities and corporate taxes in some major countries to illustrate how 
the model in this paper can be applied in these countries. The second purpose 
is to show some of the complexities involved in tax-advantaged REIT entities. 
The third is to describe the tax treatment accorded foreign investors in REITs 

































Country  Year of 
REIT  Leverage Limit  Dist’n of 
Op. Income 











Belgium  1995  65%  80%  Reinvest in 4 yrs.  Exempt  No tax  Div. taxed
b CG no tax
  33.95 
France  2003  None  85%  50% can be dist.  Exempt  Tax 30.1%  Div. taxed CG no tax  33.33 
Germany  2007  55% Prop val.  90%  Must dist. 50%  Exempt  Tax 26.375%  Taxed CG may be 
exempt  29.44 
Italy  1994  None  85%  No req. Taxed  Exempt  Taxed  Taxed  31.4 
Netherlands  1969  60%  100% 
Tax free CG 
reserve 
Exempt  Taxed  No tax  25.5 
Spain  2009  70%  90%  19% tax  19%  Div. no tax CG 
tax w/ exempts 
Div. no tax CG tax 
w/exempts  30 
UK  2007  Interest Cover >1.25  90%  No req. No tax  Exempt  Taxed  Taxed  28 
Australia  1985  75%  100%  Must Dist. All  Exempt  Taxed  Div. no tax CG tax  30 
Hong Kong  2003  45%  90%  No req. No tax  Exempt  No tax  No tax  16.5 
Japan  2000  None  90%  Must dist. 90%  Exempt  10% to 2011  Div. tax CG no tax  40.69 
Singapore  2002  35%  90%  No req. No tax  Exempt  No tax  No tax  17 
South Korea  2001  10x net Worth  90%  Must dist. 90%  Exempt  No tax  Div. tax CG no tax  24.2 
Canada  2007  None  100%  No req. No tax  Exempt  Taxed  Taxed  33 
U.S.  1960  None  90%  CG not dist. 
Taxed at CG rate.  Exempt  Tax  35% (ST) 
15% (LT) 
Div. taxed CG taxed 
at 35%  40 
Note: 
a Treatment of individual shareholders. 
b Exempt from tax if REIT is 60% residential. 
Sources:  KPMG (2009, 2010). 



































Table 1 displays some information about REITs and the corporate income tax 
rate  for  fourteen  major  nations  as  provided  by  KPMG  (2009, 2010).
1 The 
corporate income tax rate is a typical rate as estimated by  KPMG (2009) to 
include national and state and local taxes. For example, the federal income tax 
rate in the U.S. is 35%, but KPMG states the rate  as 40% as typical for the 
U.S. The corporate tax rate varies from a low of 16.5% in Hong Kong and 
17% in Singapore to a high of 40% in the U.S and 40.69% in Japan.  KPMG 
(2009) notes that interest expenses are deductible, but some countries currently 
are  limiting  the  deduction  in  response  to  budget  pressures.  Twelve  of  the 
corporate  income  tax  rates  in  Table  1  are  less  than  the  35%  used  in  the 
numerical example in the previous section, so it is possible that taxed entities 
in these countries can be more competitive in investment property markets 
than are taxed entities in the U.S. However, as shown in Table 1, nine of these 
countries place limits on the amount of leverage that REITs are permitted to 
use. It is likely that the marginal untaxed entity borrows to the allowable limit. 
 
Consider the example of Singapore, which has a corporate income tax rate of 
17% and employs a limit on REIT financial leverage of 35%. Insertion of 
these values into Equation (17) above produces a ratio of the borrowing rate to 
the risk-free lending rate of 1.59 at which Vut/VD=0 equals (1-t) = 0.83. At this 
ratio of interest rates, the untaxed entity at the limit of financial leverage and 
the taxed entity that does not borrow place the same value on an investment 
property.  For  example,  if  the  risk-free  rate  is  3.00%,  the  borrowing  rate 
implied is 4.77%.  
 
The rules that govern REITs vary from country to country, but (except for 
Spain) they all include an exemption from income tax of dividend income 
paid to shareholders. Table 1 shows that the percentage of operating income 
that must be distributed to shareholders varies from 80% (Belgium) to 100% 
(Australia and Canada). Operating income that is not distributed is taxed. The 
rules  that  govern  capital  gains  earned  by  REITs  on  the  sale  of  properties 
considerably vary. Some countries require that those gains must be distributed 
to  shareholders  in  the  same  percentage  as  operating  income  (with 
undistributed capital gains subject to taxation), while other countries require 
that some or all of the capital gains must be reinvested by the REIT. Five 
countries of the fourteen place no obligation on the use of capital gains; these 
gains are taxed in Italy and Spain and not taxed in the Netherlands, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore. The financial leverage employed by REITs is limited in 
nine countries, but not in  the other five. Dividends received by individual 
domestic investors are taxed at normal income tax rates in thirteen countries 
(except Spain), but the treatment of capital gains on the disposal of shares 
varies.    Those  capital  gains  are  taxed  in  the  ordinary  way  in  eight  of  the 
                                                           
1 REITs  with  similar  features  exist  in  other  nations,  including  Switzerland,  New 
Zealand, Malaysia, South Africa, Taiwan, India, Turkey, Brazil, Bulgaria, and are 
soon to appear (or have already been established) in Pakistan, Philippines, United 
































countries, but exempt from taxation in Belgium, Hong Kong, and Singapore 
and receive favorable tax treatment in Spain, Japan, and South Korea. 
 
The tax treatment of individual foreign investors in REITs varies from country 
to  country.  Both  dividends  and  capital  gains  upon  disposal  of  shares  are 
untaxed by the Netherlands, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Foreign investors are 
taxed by the other eleven countries, and the actual tax rate is determined by 
tax treaties. Some countries of these eleven provide a degree of favorable tax 
treatment  of  dividends  (Italy,  Spain,  Australia,  Japan)  and/or  capital  gains 
upon disposal of shares (Germany, Spain, Japan, South Korea).   
 
Foreign investors in U.S. REITs are subject to a 30% withholding rate on 
dividend income, which is taxed as ordinary income (subject to tax treaties).  
Capital gain distributions from the REITs are subject to a 35% withholding 
rate and taxed at the corporate income tax rate (35%).  Capital gains upon 
disposal  of  shares  are  subject  to  a  10%  withholding  rate  unless  the  REIT 
shares are traded on a regular securities market and the investor owns 5% or 
less  of  the  shares  or  if  the  REIT  is  domestically  controlled.  In  any  case, 
capital gains upon disposal of shares are taxed at the corporate income tax rate 
of 35%. In short, capital gains received by individual foreign investors are 
subject to the corporate income tax, whereas domestic individuals are taxed at 
15% on long-term capital gains. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
This paper considers the market for commercial real estate in a world in which 
two types of investment entities exist; those that are not subject to taxation at 
the  entity  level,  and  those  that  are  subject  to  taxation.  As  the  real  estate 
textbooks point out, untaxed entities have a substantial advantage over taxed 
entities in that they can provide greater cash flows to equity investors. This 
advantage translates into higher reservation property values, and therefore a 
greater ability to acquire investment properties. The dominance of untaxed 
entities in the market for investment properties is always found to be present if 
borrowing can be done at a risk-free rate of interest. However, if borrowing 
for  real  estate  investment  purposes  must  be  done  at  an  interest  rate  that 
exceeds the risk-free lending rate, then the dominance of untaxed entities in 
the market depends upon their level of borrowing. The simple model in this 
paper suggests that taxed entities can compete in the market for investment 
properties, but Section 5 shows that the real world of taxes and rules that 
apply to untaxed entities is complex and varies from country to country. The 
model in this paper represents only a starting point for more realistic models 
applied to particular situations.      
 
So, why do many real estate investors borrow? A full answer to this question 



































corporation subject to the corporate income tax, is one big reason. However, 
other investing entities use forms of business organization that are not subject 
to the corporate tax (such as REITs or LLCs). Interest on borrowing does not 
provide a tax deduction because there is no tax at the entity level. And yet 
many  of  these  companies  borrow.  The  reason  simply  may  be  that  these 
companies are aware of the risk-return tradeoff and select the desired expected 
rate of return to equity and attendant level of risk. Market equilibrium in the 
market  for  (a  fixed  supply  of)  investment  properties  is  established  by  the 
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Appendix:  Value, Risk, and Expected Return 
 
This Appendix provides a demonstration for Equation (14) in the text for the 
value placed on a real estate investment by an untaxed entity that borrows at 
interest rate i, which is greater than the risk-free rate rf. The Appendix also 
provides a demonstration of MM Propositions I and II. The expected rate of 
return for the untaxed entity that does not borrow is 
) , cov( / ) ( ) ( m nd f nd nd r R r S X E R E     ,    (A1) 
where nd stands for “no debt” and the other symbols are as defined in the text.  
The expected rate of return for the untaxed entity that does borrow amount D 
at interest rate i is 
) , cov( / ] ) ( [ ) ( m d f d d r R r S iD X E R E      ,  (A2) 
where d stands for debt.  Interest paid is not a deductible expense because the 
entity is not subject to income taxation. 
 
The Hamada (1969) procedure is to solve both (A1) and (A2) for E(X) and 
equate the results: 



































The covariance terms are transformed to be cov(Rnd,rm) = cov(X,rm)/Snd and 
cov(Rd,rm) = cov(X,rm)/Sd, so 
iD r S r S f d f nd   .      (A4) 
The value of the property in the absence of debt is Vnd = Snd, and the value of 
the property with debt is Vd = Sd + D.  Therefore, from (A4), 
) / 1 ( f nd d r i D V V    .      (A5) 
This is Equation (14) in the text.  Note that, if i = rf, Equation (A5) reduces to 
Vd = Vnd, which is MM Proposition I. 
 
The effect of leverage on the expected rate of return for the untaxed entity can 
be derived.  Equation (A1) can be rewritten as 
nd m f nd S r X r R E / ) , cov( ) (    ,     (A6)  
and Equation (A2) can be restated as 
d m f d S r X r R E / ) , cov( ) (    .     (A7) 
Subtraction of (A6) from (A7), along with the result (A4), produces 
] / ) )[( , cov( ) ( ) ( nd d d nd m nd d S S S S r X R E R E     .  (A8) 
                   ] / ) / )[( , cov( nd d f m S S r iD r X     (A9) 
From (A1) and the transformation of the covariance term,  
λcov(X,rm) = Snd[E(Rnd) – rf], so 
) / ]( / ][ ) ( [ ) ( ) ( d f f nd nd d S D r i r R E R E R E    .             (A10) 
If i = rf equation (A10) is the standard MM Proposition II for the effect of 
leverage on the expected rate of return to equity. If the borrowing rate exceeds 
the risk-free rate, then the expected rate of return to equity must increase with 
financial  leverage  at  a  greater  rate  to  compensate  for  the  higher  cost  of 
borrowing.  This  result  corresponds  to  the  result  in  Equation  (A5)  that  the 
value attached to the asset declines as borrowing increases if the borrowing 
rate exceeds the risk-free rate.     
 
The expected rate of return to equity for the taxed entity is found by using the 
same procedure as in Equations (A6) – (A10), and is: 
) / ]( / ) 1 ( ][ ) ( [ ) ( ) ( d f f nd nd d S D r t i r R E R E R E     .     (A11) 
Here,  E  (Rnd)  is  the  expected  rate  of  return  for  the  taxed  entity  with  no 
borrowing. This result reduces to the standard MM Proposition II if the after-
































taxed entities can also increase the expected return to equity by taking on 
more  financial  leverage.  This  result  holds  whether  the  after-tax  cost  of 
borrowing is greater than, equal to, or less than the risk-free rate – provided 
that the expected rate of return without borrowing exceeds the risk-free rate.  
Recall that the value of the property for the taxed entity declines with leverage 
if i (1-t) > rf. 
 
Equation (A11) is a slight generalization of what is known as Hamada’s (1972) 
equation  for  the  “beta”  of  a  financial  asset  with  leverage.  Substitution  of        
rf + β [E (rm) – rf] for E (Rnd) produces 
] ) ( }[ / )] / ) 1 ( [ 1 { ) ( f m d f f d r r E S D r t i r R E       .      (A12) 
Hamada’s equation for “beta” with leverage is 
] / ) 1 ( 1 [ d L S D t      . 
 
 